Den svenska underrättelseapparaten i kris: En studie av Sveriges underrättelseverksamhet i samband med ubåtsfrågan och tsunamikatastrofen

Sammanfattning: Drawing upon previous studies in the fields of organisational theory and intelligence failure, this paper examines the efforts of the Swedish intelligence community in connection to two major crises: the submarine issue of the 1980s and early 1990s as well as the tsunami disaster of 2004. Firstly, when studying its performance in both instances, the paper finds that the intelligence community failed to meet the needs of critical decision makers during both crises. In connection to the submarine issue this was mainly due to mistakes in the collection and analysis of information, while in connection to the tsunami disaster this was also caused by planning and dissemination oversights. Secondly, in assessing whether these failures necessitate a restructuring of the intelligence community, the paper finds that the warranted organisational changes have already been implemented. Regarding the problems highlighted by the submarine issue this has been done by establishing the Unit for Coordination of Military Intelligence, while the problems highlighted by the tsunami disaster have been addressed by establishing the Office for Crisis Management. Thus, the paper concludes that although the Swedish intelligence community suffered from evident organisational impediments during both crises, it has since undertaken organisational changes to mitigate these.