Why Daddy months?: How a combination of statistical discriminations and norms could explain why fathers take only a small fraction of the parental leave and why forcing them to take a bigger part could be a good idea

Sammanfattning: Since the first daddy month was introduced in 1994, it has been one of the most discussed issues in Swedish politics. At the bottom of the discussion lies the question of why women still take almost all the parental leave when the choice is free. In this thesis, I set up a model where I combine the theory on statistical discrimination with Akerlofs and Krantons identity theory.The model shows that a combination of statistical discrimination and gender related norms can explain the asymmetric use of the parental leave even in a world without genetic differences between the sexes. Furthermore, this situation could be a suboptimal equilibrium which could motivate government interventions. Reforms such as the daddy months could be a mean to shift norms towards a more optimal equilibrium. Used as a temporarily policy, daddy months can thus improve welfare in the long run. However, short term welfare losses are a price which must be paid. As long as the policy is active, the welfare effects will be negative.The thesis does not try to find the correct explanation of the current situation. What I have done is to show one possible way to motivate reforms such as the daddy months and under which assumptions the arguments hold. The current state could as well be an optimal equilibrium due to average genetic differences and the aim of the thesis is not to judge between these possible explanations, but to provide a base for discussions and for future research.