Brinnande ord och yttrandefrihetens gränser - En undersökning av koranbränningarnas rättsliga ställning i svensk rätt

Sammanfattning: The second chapter, section 1 of the instrument of Government does not pro-vide a clear interpretation of what constitutes legitimate restrictions on free-dom of expression. This causes issues concerning the interpretation of free-dom of expression in Swedish law. The vague legal text, along with varying practices in relation to the provision, result in uncertainty regarding the extent of the freedom at hand. The issue becomes particularly apparent when deter-mining the impact of legitimate restrictions, such as the provision in the Penal code chapter 16, section 8. The regulation of freedom of expression found in the instrument of Government is complemented by the European convention on human rights. The Supreme Court has expressed varying interpretations of the legal framework; however, it has stated clearly that the interpretation of any given action should always be based on the context at hand. Thus, the decisive factor when determining whether a given act constitutes a legitimate restriction on freedom of expression are the circumstances surrounding the act. However, it is not evident which situations unequivocally indicate legiti-mate restrictions, which in turn causes issues regarding predictability. The determination of whether an act constitutes a legitimate restriction is also heav-ily impacted by the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, especial-ly its use of article 10. The problem of an unclear legal situation is reflected in the fact that new phe-nomena, such as Quran burnings, cannot be clearly categorized as legal or illegal. So far, there is only one court ruling that illustrates the level required for an action to be considered punishable. The main issue is in the interpreta-tion of the requirement regarding contempt against Muslims, and whether that regularly should be considered fulfilled when a Quran is burned in a public place. Another issue is distinguishing the act from other legal actions, such as burning the Quran to express disproval of Islam as a religion. Currently, it cannot be conclusively stated that burning the Quran constitutes incitement to contempt against Muslims. However, considering the regulation of freedom of speech in the instrument of Government and the ECHR, it appears that such an assessment may not necessarily be sufficiently supported.