Om de oskiljaktiga storheternas identitet

Sammanfattning: The identity of indiscernibles is the ontological principle which prescribes that there can be no separate objects which have all the properties in common. This means that, for example, there cannot be two chairs which are perfectly similar. The principle is today assumed to have few supporters, and this is believed to be largely due to easily accessible counterexamples which have been constructed by the opponents of the principle. At a closer examination of these counterexamples, it is possible to find inherent contradictions and shortcomings which have not been considered by the opponent and which in turn have the capacity to lead to absurdities. What makes the principle particularly interesting is that it has the potential to affect one's entire ontology and view of survival, depending on whether one adheres to the principle or not. The fact that there is not yet a preliminary or acceptable answer to whether the principle should be considered valid or invalid does not make the matter any less interesting. This work aims to visualize the arguments for and against the principle that are present in the discourse and to come up with an argument which argues in the direction of the principle's validity. Which will be described later in this essay, it can be argued that an adherence to the principle is compatible with a naturalistic view of reality, but that the opposite is not.