Phenomenal consciousness without a self: Ego dissolution and its philosophical bearings

Sammanfattning: Do all conscious states structurally necessitate self-consciousness? For many, the answer is affirmative: self-consciousness is an inherent property of phenomenal consciousness. I refer to this family of theses under the denomination of Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). However, reports of DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) and MIED (Meditation-InducedEgo Dissolution) seem to suggest otherwise: there are at least some extraordinary circumstances under which no sense of self contributes to the resulting phenomenology. Similarly, subjectivity is altered in depersonalisation, a condition whereby the subject feels detached from oneself. I argue that different varieties of self-consciousness are altered or missing in concomitance with ego dissolution and depersonalisation. Nonetheless, I speculate that depersonalisation per se does not involve a lack of basic self-consciousness — while some reports of ego dissolution indicate that even the most minimal formulation of phenomenal self-consciousness is not adequately present. I identify two modalities —boundlessness and centrelessness — whose implication seems to be crucial in experiences of total lack of self-consciousness. All things considered, I conclude that, while self-consciousness could be a frequent feature of our ordinary experience, SSC is not plausible. In the absence of phenomenal self-consciousness, what remains is the epistemic observation that experiences are self-bounded: no one can have access to each other’s experiences in a first-personal manner. This ontological fact, however, need not be accompanied by a corresponding “sense of self”. Finally, I propose an account explaining the conceivableness of selfless self-reports resting on the premise of the subject being conscious and on her dispositional ability for self-consciousness.