Analys av tänkbara förändringar i intäktsramsregleringen avseende incitament för effektivt nätutnyttjande

Sammanfattning: The Swedish Energy Market Inspectorate (Ei) determines the revenue cap for the distribution system operators (DSO). As a part of determining the revenue cap there is an incentive for the DSOs to have an efficient utilisation of the grid. The incentive consists of two parts: reduced network losses and an even load in the grid. The DSOs can lower the network losses by using grid components with lower losses and having a more even load in the grid. A more even load can be achieved by moving the electrical consumption from the hours where the consumption is highest to other hours of the day. The thesis explored the incentive for an efficient utilisation of the grid. A common norm level for the reduced losses incentive was evaluated. Current norm level is based on the DSOs own historical values of network losses. Today’s incentive to even the load in the grid, new indicators and functions for the incentive was evaluated. Two of the indicators that was assessed was an average load factor and a utilisation factor. A case study was performed to see how different indicators and functions for the incentive is affected by four future scenarios. A common norm level gives the DSOs a more long-time incentive to reduce their network losses. The norm period is not zeroed out after the regulatory period as it is with a norm level based on the DSOs historical values of network losses. The current indicator, cost for the feeding grid, for the incentive to even the load does not encourage an efficient utilisation of the grid. This is since there are few DSOs who reduces their max power consumption at the same time as they reduced their cost for the feeding grid. To use an average load factor as indicator would strengthen the incentives purpose of evening out the load in the grid.