Rysslands hybridkrig i Sahel. Gamla metoder, nya aktörer? En komparativ studie om aktiva åtgärder i Mali 2019-2023 och Angola 1974-1976

Sammanfattning: Russia's renewed interest and involvement in the African continent is reminiscent of a time when the Soviet Union supported various ideologically aligned groups to win a geopolitical power struggle and assert its position as a global superpower. The motives seem to have changed, but the question is whether Russian warfare in Africa has changed as well. In this comparative study, the Soviet Union's support for the MPLA and their takeover in Angola in 1975 is compared with Russia's support for the military junta that seized power in Mali after a military coup in 2020, aiming to determine how Russian/Soviet warfare in Africa has evolved over time. Supported by Thomas Rid and Lars Ulfving's theoretical framework on so-called active measures, three operationalized variables are identified and analyzed as: white, gray, and black. Through qualitative text analysis, reports and literature from the cases are examined. The results of this study provide a deeper understanding of how hybrid warfare has been and is currently used as a means of Russian influence in Africa. The methods for this have rather been reinforced than changed historically by global development trends, especially the spread of information technology and the utilization of private companies and other actors. This study has confirmed that there is a historically rooted common Russian strategy to acquire and exert influence, a strategy based on the Soviet Union's traditional methods, active measures. A dual strategy consisting of both official policies and unofficial means where the unofficial means are driven by private actors, facilitating Russia's plausible deniability.