Självförvållat eller inte? - Om domstolarnas bedömning av ett tillstånd

Sammanfattning: Mentally disturbed offenders are treated differently in the Swedish legal system compared to other offenders. A historical review shows that the difference between the groups has varied over the years. At one point mentally disturbed offenders were released from criminal liability. Today, the so-called prison ban in The Swedish Penal Code (Penal Code) is applied. A difference between the two occurs when the court decides a sanction. The prohibition on imprisonment constitutes a presumption that another criminal sanction than imprisonment should be imposed in cases where the accused suffered from a serious mental disorder at the time of the crime. A precondition for the prohibition on imprisonment to be applied is that the defendant’s permit at the time of the crime was not self-inflicted. What constitutes a self-inflicted condition? How does the court make its assessment of whether a condition is self-inflicted or non-self-inflicted? Is there any uncertainty about the courts’ assessment of a permit? The purpose of this thesis is to answer these questions and clarify what applies. In this thesis, the legal dogmatic method is mainly used, but a concept analysis is also implemented. The terms “self-inflicted” and “has inflicted oneself” are used in two separated legal provisions in Penal Code. The result of the concept analysis describes whether the legal meanings of the two concepts correspond in the different contexts in which they are presented. The thesis states that there is uncertainty about the courts’ assessment of whether a condition is self-inflicted or non-self-inflicted. This leads to a lack of legal certainty. That this uncertainty prevails is above all based on the fact that it is neither regulated in legislation, practice nor noticed in the legal literature. The principle of the Court’s independent evaluation of evidence can also play a decisive role in the uncertainty of the courts. The principle means that it is up to the individual court to evaluate the evidence presented in a case. One consequence of the principle is that the court is not bound by what occurs in an examination conducted by a forensic psychiatrist. The examination can be carried out in cases where the defendant suffers from a serious mental disorder at the time om the crime. This can be problematic, but it can also have its benefits. One may therefore ask: “Should the principle be restricted?”