Pay-for-delay i läkemedelssektorn ur ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv

Sammanfattning: The pharmaceutical market in the EU is very complex because of its many actors with different economic and political interests as well as its legal framework. Because of these interests, the market structure as well as the structure of EU competition law and patent law, various situations arise where so-called pay-for-delay agreements are pushing the framework to its limits. These agreements are a part of a settlement in a patent infringement litigation between originators and generic competition. The agreements are exclusionary since an originator pay a generic company to delay their entry to the market with its generic version of the patented good of the originator. This may restrict the market which goes against the purpose of competition law. The purpose of patent law is to provide companies with an exclusive right, a legal monopoly, on a market. At a first glance this looks to go against the purpose of competition law. The interaction between competition law and patent law is therefore particularly interesting to investigate and pay-for-delay agreements is an example of when these fields of law intersect. This thesis explores the effect of the agreements on the relevant market, if the agreements could constitute abuse of a dominant position and in breach of 102 TFEU and on which conditions. In the case C-307/18 Generics the ECJ has for the first time considered if these agreements are unlawfully restricting the market which is a very interesting development in this field of law and this case will therefore form the foundation of the investigation of current practice.