Is the R2P- principle inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system? : - China’s indoctrination camps of Uyghur and Kazakh Muslim minorities in Former East Turkestan

Sammanfattning: During the UN World Summit 2005 all Member States of the United Nations unanimously accepted the Responsibility to protect- principle (R2P- principle), that each member state shall protect its own population from ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the set-up of the United Nations and the Security Council’s veto system in the San Francisco Conference 1945, the five permanent members of the Security Council promised that their right to veto would be used “sparingly” and in the “interest” of the world organization, to safeguard “the International peace and security”. Despite the united acceptance of the R2P- principle to avoid mass atrocities since 2005, China have been detaining up to one million Uyghur, including Kazakhs in detainment camps, in former East Turkestan since the beginning of 2018. Since the passage to invoke the R2P- principle is by the Security Council, the question arises if- the veto would serve as a deadlock on the R2P- principle if China could veto such decision. The purpose of the thesis have therefore been to analyze if the R2P- principle is inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system, by targeting China’s opportunity of vetoing the R2P- principle. The conclusion have been that the R2P- principle is inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system. This is because a permanent member can block the R2P- principle by either vetoing or double vetoing a draft resolution, which have been demonstrated by illustrating how China could veto the R2P- principle. Since the decisions of the Security Council cannot be appealed or dissent in terms of the veto card and UN Charter, it leaves the R2P- principle inefficient with a weak operational legitimacy against the Security Council’s powerful veto system, on the cost of human lives.